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This paper investigates how employee representation affects, and is affected by, 
the way corporations structure themselves. In the analytical framework 
employed in the paper, the structure of the corporation and national labour 
institutions constitute key constraints on the goals of unions and management, 
but their strategic choices and interactions also alter and transform those 
structures. This perspective attempts to reconcile classical approaches to 
strategy (e.g. by Chandler) with institutional or systemic accounts (e.g. by Hall 
and Soskice) by examining industrial relations as structured interaction. The 
interaction between corporate strategy and labour strategy, for instance, may 
give rise to an outcome other than what is predicted on the basis of existing 
national institutional arrangements. Our approach is therefore a less 
deterministic version of institutionalism, allowing scope for strategy that is rooted 
in the contested nature of institutional and organisational boundaries. 
 
Empirical analysis of the telecommunications sector - Deutche Telekom in 
Germany and NTT in Japan -- reveals that such structured interaction has led to 
markedly different outcomes, despite a broadly similar corporate strategy of 
diversification. In particular, we find that a relatively centralised managerial 
structure within the DT Group is matched with a decentralised works council 
structure and a declining presence of the unions (Verdi and IG Metall) at the DT 
companies, leading to a great diversity of human resource systems within the 
corporate group. By contrast, in Japan, despite a relatively weak position of the 
holding company in the NTT Group, the presence of a highly centralised NTT 
Union resulted in the application of a uniform human resource system for the 
whole corporate group.   4
Enterprise Boundaries and Employee Representation: 





This paper investigates how employee representation affects, and is affected by, 
the way corporations  structure themselves.  In major global industries, mergers and 
acquisitions are consolidating industry structure.  At the same time, corporate 
strategies involving diversification, spin-outs and outsourcing are creating smaller, 
decentralised operational units within, and across, the boundaries of a corporation.  The 
fragmentation of  organisations is associated with the  individualisation and 
diversification of employment conditions.  Labour has responded to such corporate 
strategy by defending a diminishing core of regular employees, surrounded by an 
expanding periphery of employees with less secure jobs. 
 
This paper examines the interaction between corporate strategy and labour 
strategy in drawing the boundary of the firm and developing employee representation 
(through unions and works councils).  The empirical case focuses on the two leading 
firms of the telecommunications sector in Germany and Japan—Deutsche Telekom and 
NTT.  In international comparisons, Germany and Japan are o ften seen as broadly 
similar  nonliberal  co-ordinated economies that value long-term commitments to key 
stakeholders including employees. In both countries, industrial relations in large firms 
is considered highly co-operative and as promoting incremental negotiated adjustments 
in employment and human resource management (Thelen and Kume 2003).  However, 
the telecommunications sector presents serious challenges to these national patterns, 
because it has been experiencing major corporate restructuring due to  rapid 
technological and regulatory changes. This provides a good opportunity to examine how 
corporate strategy and labour strategy interact when redrawing the boundary of the 
firm.  Although many telecommunications firms are undergoing rapid 
internationalisation, the paper concentrates the comparison on domestic patterns in 
order to examine the impact of different national institutions.  The empirical evidence is 
based on interviews with management (HR & corporate planning) and labour (unions, 
and works councils in the case of Germany), and documents obtained during the 
interviews (company reports and presentations, collective agreements, and unions’ 
policy documents).     5
The paper is structured as follows.  Section 1 spells out the  analytical 
framework to be  employed in this paper, focused around the notion of (a) corporate 
strategy and structure, (b) labour strategy and structure, and (c)  the interaction 
between the two sides.  Our approach stresses the  structure of the corporation and 
national labour institutions as key constraints on the goals of unions and management, 
but also how strategic interactions alter and transform those structures in unexpected 
ways. As such, our framework attempts to reconcile classical approaches to strategy (e.g. 
Chandlerian approaches) with institutional  approaches found in the  “varieties of 
capitalism” literature (e.g. Hall and Soskice) by examining industrial relations 
relationally as a structured interaction. Section 2 describes  developments in Deutche 
Telekom and activities of its works councils and relevant unions (mainly Verdi and IG 
Metall).  Section 3 gives an account of the transformation of NTT and its union.   
 
Section 4 compares the two companies in terms of corporate strategy and 
structure, as well as the evolution of union structure and shifting vertical  centres of 
gravity  within employee representation systems (e.g. DT  works councils  and NTT’s 
joint-consultation forums). We document  marked differences in two key 
outcomes—employment adjustment and the diversity of HR practices within the 
corporate group.  First, t he difference in employment adjustment  is  consistent with 
national institutional differences such as the prevalence of occupational labour markets 
in Germany and internal labour markets in Japan: adjustment is more externalised in 
the case of DT Group than in the case of NTT Group.  Second, t he different  degree of 
homogeneity or heterogeneity in human resource practices within the corporate group, 
is more surprising.  We find that HR practices in DT Group are more heterogeneous than 
in NTT Group.  The concluding section attempts to reconcile this surprising result by 
applying the framework developed in Section One.   
 
Our main argument is as follows. DT and NTT developed broadly similar 
corporate strategies of d iversification into new contiguous business areas, while 
restructuring their old fixed-line businesses.  However, they have done so in different 
ways with regard to their strategy of labour management.  DT has utilised external 
employment adjustment and allowed a greater diversity of HRM systems, whereas NTT 
utilised internal employment adjustment more exclusively and maintained much 
greater uniformity  of  group HRM.  These differences can be explained  by the 
interactions of corporate strategy and structure with labour—a perspective ignored by 
Chandler whose focus was solely on the corporate side of the story. We therefore argue   6
that institutional explanations rooted in the comparative “varieties of capitalism” (VoC) 
literature are important to understanding  the HR dimension of corporate strategies 
(Hall and Soskice 2001).  Here, emerging strategies are shaped by existing corporate and 
union structures. 
 
However, these patterns only partially conform to predictions based on national 
institutional differences in labour structure (industrial vs. enterprise unions) as found 
in the VoC literature.  Here, corporate restructuring involving spin-outs and de-mergers 
may force a previously unified enterprise union to undergo fragmentation into several 
enterprise unions  each with its own working conditions, whereas industrial unions 
promote  uniform conditions for the same occupations across firms facing similar 
restructuring.  But there is an indeterminacy or gap between labour strategy and 
structure often missed by existing institutional theory (but see Sorge 1991; Jackson 
2003).  Here labour strategy (and perhaps strategic mistakes) plays an important role in 
explaining NTT-DT differences.  Hence, by stressing the ongoing evolution and mutual 
adjustment of both corporate and labour strategies, our approach is a less deterministic 
version of institutionalism, allowing more scope for strategy that is rooted in the 
contested nature of institutional and organisational boundaries.  
 
 
1. Analytical Framework: Strategy and Structure for Management and Labour 
 
  The analytical framework adopted in this study centres around the notion of 
interaction between corporate strategy and  labour strategy (Sako 2003).  The 
starting point for this study is therefore Chandlerian: how does strategy determine 
structure, and what is the various ways in which structure and strategy influence 
each other?   Where we depart from the usual analysis in business strategy is the 
equal regard given to the strategy and structure of labour organisations.   
 
  Chandler (1962) defines strategy as the planning and carrying out of the growth 
of  organisations, and  structure as the  organisational form devised to administer 
activities and resources (Chandler 1962, p.13).  Simply put, business strategy influences 
corporate structure.  As companies constantly reassess their commitment to business in 
specific product markets, they decide whether or not to enter new markets and 
withdraw from existing ones.  The strategy of business diversification has led previously 
single-product firms to adopt the holding company structure (H-Form), a more   7
centralized functional structure (U-Form), and a multidivisional structure (M-Form).  
The related make-or-buy decisions affect another aspect of organisation structure, 
namely the extent of vertical integration.  More generally, the nature of vertical control 
of subsidiaries by the parent company, or of operating companies by the holding 
company is an important dimension of structure.  Corporate structure may, therefore, be 
understood t o have two dimensions—the extent of horizontal diversification and the 
nature of vertical articulation (in the form of financial and strategic control) in the 
corporate hierarchy.   
 
Chandler’s framework has received numerous appraisals, some quite critical. 
One key criticism is that its reliance on transaction cost economics gave too much regard 
to rational planning followed by execution and profit maximisation as the objective of 
the corporation.   The  strategic management literature now  distinguishes his 
classical perspective of strategy as rational planning for profit maximisation, from 
more processual and evolutionary perspectives (Whittington 2001).   Here strategy 
is not ‘the planning and carrying out of the growth of organisations’ (Chandler 1962, 
p.13) but ‘a set of broad commitments made by the firm that define and rationalise 
its objectives and how it intends to pursue them’ (Nelson 1991, p.67).  Likewise, 
structure is not  ‘the organisational form devised to administer activities and 
resources’ (Chandler 1962, p.13), but ‘how a firm is organised and governed, and how 
decisions actually are made and carried out’ (Nelson 1991, p.67).1  Strategy tends to 
define a desired firm structure in a general way, but does not dictate the details.  Also, 
strategy and structure call forth and shape organisational capabilities, but what an 
organisation can do well has something of a life of its own (Nelson 1991).  The current 
framework adopts this evolutionary perspective, in which the malleability in matching 
strategy and structure and the paths followed to develop organisational capabilities give 
rise to differences among firms in the same line of business facing identical market 
conditions. 
 
  Another criticism comes from the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) literature that 
stresses the causation not from strategy to structure, but from structure to strategy 
(Hall and Soskice 2001).  According to VoC, national institutions (e.g. industrial 
relations, financial systems, education systems and inter-firm co-ordination and 
competition)  influence the ways in which corporate structures evolve.2  It is those 
                                                 
1 Chandler (1992) himself has come to endorse a more evolutionary definition. 
2 For a review of various comparative institutional approaches to studying business   8
existing corporate structures that dictate corporate strategy, for instance specialising in 
sectors requiring radical technical change in liberal market economies and in s ectors 
requiring incremental innovation in co-ordinated market economies.  Diverse structures 
yield comparative institutional advantages for different types of economic activity.  In 
highlighting the importance of institutional context in shaping business,  strategic 
adjustment of firms is seen to exhibit a strong path dependence grounded in 
institutional opportunities and constraints.  Moreover, firms exhibit strong institutional 
isomorphism within the bounds of discrete national business systems—these differences 
being stressed over sectoral or firm-level variation.   
 
  There is a labour version to linking strategy and structure, which is just as 
important as the corporate side in the current study.  Traditionally, the academic 
discussion on the structure of labour organisations, and in particular unions, is divided 
into that on internal structure and external structure. The internal structure refers to 
the administrative governance of union organisations (Undy et al 1981, 1996).  The 
external structure refers to specific forms unions may take, such as craft, industrial, 
enterprise and conglomerate unions.  The boundary for unions is drawn with regard to 
such factors as  the growth of markets (Commons 1909), the development of national 
labour markets (Ulman 1955), the vintage effect of technology (Clegg 1976), and social 
identity (Herrigel 1993).  In our framework, labour strategy is formulated with a view to 
promoting the interest of workers with a specific identity, and such strategy determines 
the desirable union structure.  At the same time, the pre-existing union structure has a 
momentum in giving rise to certain types of labour strategy.  In fact, Streeck (1993) 
points to this two-way causation in linking identity, interest, organisation structure, and 
institution. 
 
  Just as in the case of corporate structure, two dimensions  are important  to 
thinking about the structure of employee representation.  One is the horizontal scope – 
how broad or narrow the boundary of the union organisation is in relation to a corporate 
group or an industrial sector.  Another is the degree of vertical articulation and the 
centre of gravity in that articulation, be it in the national-industrial-local levels or at 
different levels through  a corporate  hierarchy (in the case of works councils and 
Japanese enterprise unions).  For example, how centralised or decentralised is the 
decision-making process of an employee organisation over pay bargaining or industrial 
                                                                                                                                               
systems, see Jackson 2003.   9
action, and what is the degree of autonomy of local units within it? 
 
  The analytical framework to be employed in this paper combines the insights 
from the above discussion (see Figure 1).  First, corporate strategy and structure affect 
each other.  Second, the strategy and structure of employee representation affect each 
other.  Third, corporate strategy and labour strategy interact with each other in complex 
ways.  This framework enables us to clarify some of these interactive mechanisms.  For 
example, labour strategy influences not only union structure, but also corporate 
structure in both indirect and direct ways.  Labour strategy leads to the choice of a 
certain union structure.  In turn, management takes into account the way unions are 
structured when deciding on corporate structure.  Labour strategy may also influence 
corporate structure more directly, for instance by being consulted on the creation of new 
subsidiaries or plans for hiving off internal divisions.  Conversely, corporate strategy has 
both indirect and direct effects on union structure.  Indirectly,  changing  corporate 
structure may motivate labour organisations to respond by changing their own structure.  
Directly, corporate strategy towards labour may attempt to influence union structure, 
for example, by fragmenting it to weaken union power. 
 
  A key insight from this framework is the contested nature of social boundaries 
(see Tilly 2003; Lamont and Molnár 2002). Boundaries are defined in relational 
terms—distinctive sets of relations on each side of the boundary, relationships across the 
boundary, and a shared representation of the zone itself. Corporate restructuring may 
involve the inscription of newly invented or borrowed organisational boundaries, the 
erasure of past boundaries or the displacement of persons or groups across existing 
boundaries. For example, 
 
•  corporate strategy may challenge established boundaries among employees.  
Mergers may involve the erasure of boundaries among employees, while hive-offs 
may involve the invention of new boundaries.   
•  Labour strategy may also challenge established corporate boundaries by extending 
collective agreements across firms or decentralising bargaining and representation 
rights to exploit firm- or occupation-specific assets.   
•  Not all strategies may be equally available to each side. National institutional 
settings  may favour particular types of boundaries (e.g. due to labour law, 
competition and regulatory policy, etc.). Here existing corporate and labour 
structures may enable or constrain particular strategies.  At the same time,   10
companies and unions may use political action to enhance bargaining power to 
implement a specific chosen strategy. 
 
Such boundary shifts have strong consequences for managerial control, exploitation and 
mobilisation of collective action. Accordingly, while the boundaries of corporate structure 
may be taken for granted once they are set, they often become contested when attempts 
are made to change them. Whenever corporate and labour strategies attempt to shift 
boundaries, power play between the two sides may lead to a single negotiated boundary, 
or a boundary one party imposes on the other. Yet another possibility is for an 
organisation to have fuzzy boundaries, or multiple rings of who are in the inner core, 
who are semi-insiders, and who are outsiders.  In sum, our framework introduces two 
modifications to existing approaches.  We depart from Chandler (1962) by not focusing 
solely on the corporate side of the story, but by giving equal weights to labour and 
corporate strategies.  We depart from the VofCap framework in seeing institutions not 
only as constraints, but involving strategic interactions that  highlight the often 
contested nature of organisational and institutional boundaries.  
 
 
2. Deutche Telekom 
 
  This section begins by examining the corporate strategy and structure of DT 
from the pre-privatisation reforms of 1989 to present. We then review the union 
structure, as well as vertical articulation of employee representation through works 
councils within the DT group.  The last part examines the interactions between 
corporate and union  strategy by looking at processes and outcomes of collective 
bargaining and consultation within the DT group. 
 
  In principle, both management and unions have continued to favour a 
more-or-less homogeneous set of HRM practices for specific occupations within the DT 
group.  However, actual employment conditions display considerable diversity.  This 
diversity arose, at least partially, as an unintended consequence of structural changes 
on both the management and labour side, and also due to certain institutional 
characteristics in the German system of employee representation.  Initially, labour 
conditions from the parent company were not imposed onto “new” group business units. 
This was largely due to the union typically not objecting to new business units offering 
conditions which were better than the minimum set by the parent company agreement.    11
It was also due to the decentralised nature of works councils, typically with weak voice 
at the corporate and holding company levels.  Consequently, a number of strategic 
difficulties arose for both sides in coping with this de facto diversity.   Both management 
and labour have made efforts to partially re-centralise and re-standardise certain 
parameters of HRM.  Rather than reasserting the conditions from the parent company, 
innovations from the new units have been adapted and adopted within the core as part 
of strategic efforts to adapt to a changing business environment.  The outcome of these 
negotiated co-ordination efforts is a compromise between the forces for integration and 
diversity of both sides. 
 
 
Corporate Strategy and Structure 
Traditionally, telecommunications services were provided by the state as part of 
the Deutsche Bundespost (DBP). Under  Germany’s Basic  Law, the DBP was an 
administrative section of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications.  The DBP was 
governed by informal corporatist arrangements involving tri-partite negotiations 
between the  Ministry, the union and various equipment suppliers.  The issue of 
privatisation emerged after a substantial push from the EU starting around 1984. EU 
countries increasingly feared U.S. technological leadership, and wanted to p romote 
private investment in telecommunications. Britain had an important influence, both 
ideologically by the rise of Thatcherism and through the rapid privatisation of British 
Telecom in 1979. The 1987 EU Green Paper marks a key watershed that sparked 
reforms in Germany (Kress 1997). 
 
A series of major reforms were initiated to transform t he organisational 
structure of the DBP.  Following  preparations by the liberal coalition government 
(CDU/FDP) in 1985, the Post Reform I (Poststrukturgesetz) in 1989 separated the DBP 
into three separate operations—telecommunications, postal services and the postal 
banking.  A key aim was to separate regulatory and operative decision-making. The DBP 
nonetheless continued under the mandate of providing public services and basic 
infrastructure. A monopoly was retained on voice telecommunication, while competition 
was introduced in the areas of mobile and satellite communications. 3  
 
The Post Reform II ( Postneuordnungsgesetz) went further to privatise the 
                                                 
3 Mannesmann Mobilfunk GmbH (D2) received the first license for a competing mobile 
communications network in December 1989.   12
telecommunications business in January 1995.  The Deutsche Telekom AG (DT) was 
created as private corporation with  100% state-ownership.  Privatisation weakened 
political  influence on  corporate strategy,  and  freed DT  from subsidising other DBP 
businesses, as well as from restrictions on international joint ventures. Importantly, DT 
was given the right to directly employ civil servants—who made up roughly half of those 
employed.  However, newly employed persons  could no longer be given civil servant 
status.  DT subsequently made an IPO on 18 November 1996, selling 26% of the stock to 
private investors.  A further stake was s ubsequently sold to a state-owned bank, the 
Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau.  During the mergers with VoiceStream and Powertel, 
new shares were issued that diluted state ownership from 59.6% in 2000 to 43% in 2001.   
 
The Post Reform II was implemented through a reorganisation plan 
“Telekom-Kontakt”, developed in conjunction with McKinsey & Co..  The operations 
were divisionalised, and the traditional regionally-based full-service branches were 
reorganised into separate regional branches for 1) business customers, 2) private 
customers, and 3) technical and network services. The reorganisation also aimed to 
decentralise decision-making and business responsibility to these operating units.  
These structures soon proved problematic due to strong rivalry and unclear boundaries 
between the business and p rivate customer branches.  These two areas were 
reintegrated in the late 1990s, and a large proportion of their employees now work in the 
large call centres responsible for customer contact.  Meanwhile, the network services 
branches were faced with the most severe personnel restructuring.  Due to the 
digitalisation of the telephone network, investment in this area declined roughly 50% 
and a large proportion of service technicians (Fernmeldehandwerker) became redundant 
(Kalkowski et al. 2001).  In 1999, the number of branches was drastically reduced from 
39 to 13.   
 
The Post Reform II aimed to prepare DT for  liberalisation of the fixed-line 
market through the Post Reform III in 1998. The Telekommunikationsgesetzes (TKG) of 
1996 created the independent Regulatory Authority for Telecommunications and Posts 
(RegTP).  The RegTP started operations in 1998 as part of the Ministry of Economics, 
thereby replacing the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (BMPT) and Federal 
Office for Post and Telecommunication (BAPT).  
 
  Parallel to these reforms,  DT embarked on a new strategy of horizontal 
business diversification and reorganisation toward its present multidivisional structure.   13
This strategy was prompted by the absence of organic growth in the fixed line business, 
coupled with expansion into  technologically new areas and international markets 
through acquisition. The resulting structure includes four divisions (see Figure 2):4   
 
•  T-Com (fixed line network, accounting for 47% of Group sales but 70% of Group 
employment),  
•  T-Mobile (mobile communications, with 34% of sales and 5% of employment ),  
•  T-Systems (IT and communications systems, 15% of sales and 24% of employment) 
and  
•  T-Online (internet services, 3% of sales and 1% of employment).  
 
T-Com division is not a separate legal entity, such that the fixed-line operations remain 
directly within the parent company.  The division itself cuts across the firm boundaries 
to include several foreign telephone networks acquired by DT AG. The other divisions 
constitute more o r less “ new” business fields.  Here t he basic  strategy  was to  either 
hive-off or newly create a domestic business subsidiary.   
 
  T-Mobile was created as a hive-off of the domestic mobile business. A digital 
mobile communications network T -D1 was established in July 1992,  alongside  the 
analogue C -Netz that operated since 1985.  Deutsche Telekom Mobilfunk GmbH 
overtook all mobile operations in June 1993.  At the end of that year, they had 3,200 
employees. Subsequently, a number of international acquisitions were bundled under 
T-Mobile International AG (1999) 
 
  T-Systems  bundles together a wide array of businesses providing 
communication networks and  IT systems solutions.  In  1992, business lines were 
separated according to the type of customer, e.g. T -Systems  CSM GmbH (est. Sep. 9, 
1992).  But customers faced growing problems of lateral division of labour, so the small 
and large business customers were reintegrated.  Eventually, DeTeSystem was formed 
in 1997 bundling through various parts of these businesses, plus adding a substantial 
number of external recruits. Debis Systemhaus was purchased from the 
DaimlerChrysler group in 2000.  Also i n 2000, T -Systems International GmbH was 
formed as an international management holding to co-ordinate this division. 
 
                                                 
4 In addition, Kabel Deutschland GmbH is a cable television company spun-off from the 
parent in 1998 and is presently being sold.   14
  T-Online began in 1995 as a brand name for new email and internet services. 
Its predecessor was Btx email system, as well as videotext services from the 1980s.  
After the advent of the internet, T-Online was seen as needing great flexibility in the 
market.  In June 1996, an independent company T-Online Pro Dienste GmbH & Co KG 
was created. A very low percentage of the workforce came from the parent company. The 
name was changed to T-Online International in January 2000.  An IPO was made on the 
Neuer Markt on April 17, 2000 to give T-Online an independent acquisition currency for 
M&A.  DT retains 71.9% of the shares. The business operations increasingly involve the 
programming and preparation of content for the internet.    
 
  How interdependent are these various group companies?  First, the operational 
links between group companies varies quite a bit.  T-Systems is responsible for all IT 
delivery within the DT group, as well as selling T-Com products to outside customers as 
part of network technologies.  T -Online h as developed the software used for billing 
services throughout the entire group, as well as buying network capacity at market 
prices from T -Com.  The latter is required by regulation that forbids T -Com to 
discriminate against competitors.  Second, the percentage of employees coming from the 
parent company also differs substantially between divisions and even among various 
subsidiaries within T-Systems.  Whereas some divisions have a substantial legacy as an 
internal division of DT, other companies were more or less grown up as independent 
companies outside the parent.  As will be discussed below, this growth strategy has a 
strong impact on the HRM systems within the DT group. 
 
  The vertical articulation of management within the DT group is also complex. 
German corporate law mandates two-tier corporate boards with a separate Supervisory 
and Management Board.  In principle, corporate  management is controlled by  the 
Supervisory  Board, and likewise subsidiary management is controlled by its own 
Supervisory Board (perhaps with members from the parent Management Board). For 
example, T-Online has a 5-person management board.  The Chair Thomas Holtrop was 
recruited externally from Deutsche Bank 24.   Meanwhile, the labour director Veronika 
Altmeyer is a former union o fficial of the Deutsche Postgewerkschaft, and was 
previously labour director at T -Nova.  6 out of 10 Supervisory Board seats from the 
owners bench were delegates from DT, including 2 management board members.  
Furthermore, 2 bank representatives and one Finance Ministry representative hold 
seats. 
   15
  The DT management board is responsible for group strategy, while power for 
operational decision-making has been increasingly decentralised.  Following 1995, 
group companies enjoyed considerable autonomy for several years.  But DT 
management later sought to reassert greater strategic control in the affairs of subsidiary 
companies, leading to some tensions between group companies. In late 2002, the 
management board was reshuffled to improve bottom-up involvement into the central 
strategy.   
 
Apart from the boards, the central strategy department also has direct links to 
the divisional strategy departments.  In the area of personnel, the DT group created an 
internal employers` association (Arbeitgeberverband Telekom - AGV-T). The association 
is organised across three levels: 
 
•  A Group Management Circle consists of the personnel directors from the DT 
divisions and individual subsidiaries, and is the supreme decision-making 
body reporting to the DT AG personnel director. 
•  two  Strategy Circles regarding employment conditions and senior 
management are working groups that co-ordinate and prepare decisions. 
•  a General Assembly meeting twice a year to discuss the association itself 
and collective bargaining strategy. 
 
The association was created as DT recognised the need to co-ordinate group 
HRM strategy, but continuing to allow the divisions responsibility for detailed 
development and implementation.  The present philosophy of DT management is to 
maintain one homogeneous system of HRM within the group regarding the terms of 
employment—working time, annual leave, company pensions, etc.  However, 
management does not consider basic wage levels and performance-related pay as part of 
the basic system.  Hence, wage levels are oriented toward the respective business areas 
and market positions of the individual group companies. 
 
Management perceives synergy effects in dealing with some issues in a 
group-wide fashion, and these play an important role in the strategic goal of 
maintaining some uniformity of group employment systems—including issues related to 
civil servants. Facilitating the continued mobility of employees within the DT group 
remains a major goal in this regard.  The AGV-T performs a number of key functions.  
The association p articipates in collective bargaining alongside the subsidiaries`   16
management, thus giving some continuity and co-ordination to the employer’s side in 
the collective bargaining process.  Externally, the association is a focus of lobbying 
efforts within the Federation of German Employers` Associations (BDA) and at the EU.  
And the association performs information-gathering services regarding labour law 
issues.  
 
  In sum, a few features of the DT group management can be noted.  First, the 
horizontal diversity within the DT group has increased rapidly since privatisation in 
1995.  Old core operations now constitute roughly 50% of group-wide business with a 
considerable portion now coming from new IT related businesses.  Moreover, much of 
this growth has taken place externally, by large-scale M&A and new recruitment at 
established subsidiaries.    This diversification entails strong centrifugal forces to 
increasing the autonomy of group companies as they cope with the different sectoral 
business environments.   
 
Second, management strategy nonetheless remains quite centralised.  Despite 
decentralising operational management, DT clearly intends for important strategic 
parameters to remain centralised in the head office.  A balance between co-ordination 
and control vs. autonomy remains very difficult to achieve, and has driven DT to nearly 
perpetual organisational restructuring.  An early honeymoon stage of rapid growth and 
high autonomy for group companies has been followed by attempts to reassert a more 
centralised strategic vision.   This trend has been confirmed by the contributions 
required from group companies to the overall debt reduction of the group—which has 
involved the sale of business units and reduction of personnel even at profitable 
businesses. 
 
Third, several reasons can be cited for the continued efforts at centralised 
co-ordination and control.  One aspect is that intra-group business remains moderately 
high.  T -Online represents the most independent division, partially due to regulatory 
barriers.  But for the other divisions, joint business strategy still provides a significant 
rationale for centralised decision-making.  Another key reason is that group-wide 
personnel practices remain an important concern for management.  This relates, in part, 
to the employment of (on-leave) civil servants throughout various group companies.  
This demand for intra-group mobility must be understood in the context of employment 
adjustment and the corporate strategy of cost cutting. 
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Employee Representation -- Strategy and Structure within Germany`s Dual System 
  The structure of employee representation at DT follows the German “dual” 
pattern of collective bargaining by unions and legally mandated codetermination rights 
given to works councils and through seats on corporate Supervisory Boards.   
 
Today, four unions operate within the DT group.  German unions are structured 
according to industrial sectors, which means that only one union is responsible for each 
sector’s employees and companies. Furthermore, one union negotiates a collective 
agreement for each sector.  The growth of telecommunications and IT has undermined 
the sectoral demarcations between German unions, because companies in 'traditional' 
sectors have expanded into these new growth markets. Four major unions organised 
firms were present in communications by the year 2000, although two of these now fall 
under Verdi. In the IT sector, seven major unions were present and often with 
considerable overlap within the same firm. 5  In particular, many of firms organised by 
the Metalworkers union have diversified into these new technology fields. 
 
The largest  union within DT is the  Unified Service Sector Union (Vereinte 
Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft, Verdi), which was formed in June 2001 through a 
mega-merger between 5 major u nions.6  Verdi boasts a membership of over 3 million 
members. DT workers are a powerful voice within this union, constituting 95% of union 
members within the telecommunications  division and 6% of the total union.  Prior to 
Verdi, DT was organised by the Deutsche Postgewerkschaft (DPG) that operated 
essentially as an enterprise union.  The DPG had a history of very close relationships 
with both Telekom works councils and management.  In fact, a high proportion of DT 
group labour directors are former DPG members.  The reorganisation of the DPG into a 
conglomerate union, Verdi, took substantial organisational resources and drained efforts 
from union organising.   
 
Alongside Verdi, two minority unions also have a lasting presence. The 
Kommunkiationsgewerkschaft  DPV was formed in 1997 as an independent union 
                                                 
5 For the union representation in various firms, see 
http://www.eiro.eurofound.ie/2000/12/feature/DE0012297F.html        
6 These five unions are:  Deutschen Angestellten-Gewerkschaft, Deutschen 
Postgewerkschaft, Gewerkschaft Handel, Banken und Versicherungen, 
Industriegewerkschaft Medien and Gewerkschaft Öffentliche Dienste, Transport und 
Verkehr.   18
primarily representing the civil servants.  DPV Kom is the successor of the 
long-standing Deutsche Postverbandes (DPV) and member of the civil servants 
association.  The Christliche Gewerkschaft Post und Telekommunikation (CGPT) also 
has a long history as part of the Christian union movement in Germany.  These unions 
together receive about 10% of votes in works councils elections, and sign extensions to 
the main collective agreements with Verdi.   
 
  The fourth  union, the  Metalworkers' Trade Union (Industriegewerkschaft 
Metall, IGM) organises a significant number of employees within the T-Systems division.  
T-Systems formed by bringing together the internal telecommunications and IT service 
division ( DeTeSystem)  and debis Systemhaus—a  service division bought from 
DaimlerChrysler in March 2000.  Debis was organised by IGM, and have been covered 
by a supplementary collective agreement with IGM agreement since 1998.  When Debis 
was created in 1990, the original 2,400 workers from Daimler were covered under the 
sectoral agreement of IG Metall.  However, management refused to apply these 
conditions to new hires as the company expanded to over 10,000 employees. The debis 
agreement supplements the sectoral-level metal workers’ agreement with innovative 
elements regarding working time and performance-related pay. 7  Meanwhile, the 
DeTeSystem was organised by DGP and now Verdi.  The group works council (KBR) has 
members from unions, although Verdi aspires to have sole responsibility for T-Systems.  
 
In November 2000, the German Federation of Trade Unions (Deutscher 
Gewerkschaftsbund, DGB) issued guidelines in order to clarify the responsibility for 
organising given these changes of sectoral boundaries, on one hand, and the mergers 
among union, on the other. The union federation remains committed to avoiding union 
competition, and maintaining a principle of one union per company in the event that 
multiple unions have responsibilities within the sector.  The guidelines, put simply, give 
IGM responsibility for hardware production in both telecommunications and IT, 
whereas Verdi is responsible for service-related elements. Despite these efforts, severe 
union competition continues to exist within T-Systems.  The result has been a patchwork 
of different collective agreements and very heterogeneous standards within the 
T-Systems division. 
 
                                                 
7 The new Debis agreement was formally concluded on behalf of the employers’ 
association and was thus intended to be a model for other IT firms.  See 
http://www.eiro.eurofound.ie/1998/03/feature/DE9803257F.html for details.   19
Several substantive issues stand behind the union cleavage:  First, Verdi sets 
stricter limits of performance-related pay at about 10% of total salary, whereas the debis 
agreement accepts higher proportions.  Second, Verdi stresses more labour involvement 
in evaluating target setting for performance-related pay, whereas IGM has left more 
discretion to management. Last, the debis agreement places less restrictions on working 
hours than at DT.  Many debis employees work under so-called discretionary working 
time (Vertrauensarbeitzeit), whereas Verdi favours stricter mandatory limits to working 
hours to avoid self-exploitation and burn-out among high-tech workers.  However, at a 
more basic level, these unions may be seen in a rather zero-sum competition for 
members in an emerging sector that is badly needed to offset declining membership in 
other sectors.  This conflict also has strong implications for the  boundaries of the 
corporation itself.  Merging T-System with ITS (formerly debis) has been delayed by a 
court petition placed by IG Metall and the works council, claiming that a fusion would 
infringe on the existing collective agreement that it perceives as more favourable.   
 
  The second channel of employee representation within DT  is  the  system of 
works councils. 8  Works councils are arranged hierarchically into three or four levels.  At 
the establishment-level, works councils (Betriebsrat  – BR) are directly elected by the 
local employees and responsible for local working conditions.  A corporate-level works 
council (Gesamtbetriebsrat  – GBR) is formed at each company by delegates from the 
various establishment-level works councils.  For example, the DT AG has 80 local BRs 
and T-Mobile 43 BRs covered by their GBR (see Figure 4 for a schematic representation).  
The GBR is a key actor, since they have access to top management and are central in the 
flow of information.  They have the strongest legal rights, and have an economic affairs 
committee that consults with management about the financial results and business 
plan. 
   
A group company-level works council (Konzernbetriebsrat – KBR) was created in 
1996. The KBR has 30 members, half from the GBR of the parent DT AG and half from 
the GBRs (or BR in the case of single-establishment companies within a GBR) of 15 
different subsidiary companies.  This constitutes all majority-owned group companies 
located in Germany.  The case of T-Systems is special in that over 20 GBRs exist within 
TSI group.  Hence, they have chosen to form their own KBR for TSI alone, as well as 
being members of the overall KBR.  The legal standing of the KBR is less clearly defined 
                                                 
8 Prior to privatisation, DT fell under the Bundespersonalvertretungesetz, a law that 
stipulated a different model codetermination rights for civil servants.   20
than the GBR, and many of the arrangements at DT must be viewed as contractual 
extensions and modifications of the formal law.  Foremost, the KBR is a voluntary 
institution and needs the support of both the GBR and management to be created.   
 
The KBR serves as a long-arm of the GBRs in getting access to decision-making 
at the group level.  Its domain relates only to group-wide affairs, and KBR negotiates 
agreements that are then implemented by the various GBRs.  At DT, issues for such 
agreements have been gender equality, travel regulations, and hiring practices. Recently, 
two key issues have been employment adjustment and conditions for employees outside 
collective agreements.  Over time, a shift can be observed such that an increasing 
number of issues are being regulated at the group-level. Often these agreements have 
had unexpected consequences for individual firms and their GBRs, and proven hard for 
the GBRs to adapt to local conditions.  Hence, a very high demand for consensus and 
information exchange is necessary for the KBR to operate effectively.  This evolution 
toward a stronger KBR has resulted to a significant extent as a response to management 
strategy, which reasserted stronger control from the centre and has attempted to “use” 
the KBR increasingly as an effective tool. 
 
How have these structures influenced  the strategies of unions and works 
councils?  Labour strategies have allowed considerable de facto diversity of employment 
conditions to emerge within the DT group.  Collective bargaining within DT has 
basically taken place company-by-company. Union demands for percentage wage 
increases have been basically identical for each company. 9  But some DT group 
companies such as T-Online are not covered by any collective agreement.  This is quite 
unusual in Germany, where industrial unions usually negotiate sectoral agreements. As 
new companies were created or hived-off, employees from the parent company were 
covered by transitional agreements that guaranteed their basic monthly wage.  However, 
they were no longer covered under the old agreement regarding future wage hikes and 
various workplace rules.  Meanwhile, newly hired employees at the group companies 
were often initially not covered under any collective agreement.  As the emerging HR 
practices  became formalised within new collective agreements, considerable diversity 
existed in basic levels of pay, the number of job categories and working hours 
                                                 
9 The DPG made uniform wage demands at the three companies post, post bank and DT 
in the 1997, 1999 and 2000 negotiations.  The outcomes were basically identical before 
2000, when DT deviated from the others in introducing the performance-related pay 
(NBBS) system. Sometimes joint collective agreements have been signed as well, such as 
the 1998 agreement of DT AG and T-Mobil regarding the conditions for tele-workers.   21
arrangements (See Table 1). 
 
T-Mobile provides a good  case.  After the initial creation, the central DT 
management left T-Mobile alone.  Salaries for new hires were more or less negotiated on 
an individual basis for several years.  This changed in 1996.  On the management side, 
DT management intervened and attempted to re-integrate HRM practices to a much 
greater extent.  On the labour side, the corporate level works council signed an 
agreement that established a basic system of job classifications—the first time for a DT 
group company to officially introduce a new scale.  Individual negotiations over salaries 
had introduced much variation within the company, so both sides  saw a need to 
systematise HRM practices and standardise pay for similar work within the firm. The 
first collective bargaining agreement  with the DPG  followed in 1997.  
Performance-related pay was officially introduced and set at 10% of total salary.  This 
agreement was signed with strong involvement of the parent DT management.  The case 
set a precedent for other group companies, whereby a comparable system would be 
established but actual wages were allowed to differ.   
 
A crucial question emerges, particularly in contrast to NTT, as to why labour was 
uninterested or unable to enforce a uniform system of HR practices for the whole DT 
Group. One obvious reason is that different unions were present across the divisions, 
and  also that union organisation rates were drastically different.  Whereas about 70% of 
parent company employees are union members, these figures drop to around 25% at TSI, 
15% at T -Mobile and just 5% at T -Online.  Moreover, the DBP underwent its own 
massive reorganisation and integration into Verdi, which may have caused a period of 
neglect in union organising and co-operation with the newly forming works councils.  A 
second reason is that the employment conditions for new employees in new business 
units were generally better than the conditions prevailing in the existing parent fixed 
line business units.  Giving the cyclical developments in IT and communications, going 
rates in the external labour market were quite favourable and unions felt little need to 
intervene immediately.  Works councils, decentralised with their centre of gravity at the 
establishment level, have little incentive to behave in a solidaristic fashion when 
promoting uniformity may lead to perceived reductions in benefits.  Perhaps even more 
compelling was the fact that subsidiaries had to match or better the parent company 
conditions to induce employees to transfer.  Given restrictions on dismissal at the parent 
company, transfers have been a necessary part of the employment adjustment process to 
be discussed later in detail.  A  third reason may also lie in the perceived   22
inappropriateness in applying the old DT HRM system to new businesses.  Evidence for 
this is provided by the long-planning process and implementation of a new HRM system 
at DT.  By this time, innovations among group companies then became a template for 
reforming the parent company itself.   
 
In July 2001, DT AG introduced a new pay system (Neue Bewertungs und 
Bezahlungssystem – NBBS) to emulate some elements initially introduced at T-Mobile 
in 1997.  This agreement represents a drastic departure from the previous collective 
agreements, which set wages according to the principles of the civil service. By contrast, 
the NBBS stresses individual achievement and job function as primary determinants of 
the basic salary.  Applying the new scheme has proven exceptionally difficult, and led to 
over 20,000 complaints about individual salaries. Given these implementation problems, 
management and labour have both abandoned the idea of an identical wage system 
throughout the DT group, preferring a more open approach to co-ordination.  The NBBS 
is applied to civil servants on-leave, but does not directly apply to civil servants.  Here 




DT strategy of restructuring has avoided outright dismissals and utilised a variety of 
benevolent adjustment measures to reduce and reallocate employment within the group 
(see Darbishire 1997).  Under German legislation, employment protection law is quite 
strict and gives considerable rights to works councils in the negotiation of employment 
adjustment.  In addition, the special legal rights of civil servants and similar rights 
given contractually to senior employees increase the level of employment  security.  In 
1995, the DPG negotiated the key job protection agreement.  The essence was to allow 
substantial personnel reduction through very generous adjustment programs.  Between 
1995 and 2000, around 90,000 employees left DT under these programs.  Available 
statistics on 70,000 employees from 1995-1998 show the following distribution: 
 
•  33% left through natural fluctuation, including invalidity pensions.  The latter 
mechanism was used increasingly in 1999 and 2000.  
•  30% left through early retirement programs. 
•  29% were induced to leave voluntarily through severance pay. 
•  7% received job switching bonuses paid to civil servants.  
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The first three categories can only be understood in relation to the German welfare state.  
These external measures of adjustment operate by inducing people to leave employment 
through a sharing of burdens between the company and the social welfare system  While 
a complete description of these programs can be found elsewhere, these schemes operate 
through a combination of transitory payments made as by the company, qualification for 
unemployment insurance and then qualification for state pensions at an early age as 
long-term unemployed.  Invalidity pensions operate similarly by allowing qualified 
persons to receive special pensions. By 2003, only 2,000 of 160,000 T -Com employees 
were over age 60.  Thus, DT can be seen as an extreme example of the German 
“externalistion regime” (Rosenau and Naschold 1994) in facilitating co-operative 
employment adjustment in large firms by placing growing burdens on the German 
welfare state. 
 
In addition to outright personnel reduction, nearly 24,000 people were 
transferred to group companies from the parent.  Transfers were operated under the 
Personnel Management Services (PMS) as an internal clearing house for matching 
people and jobs within the DT group.  The union feels unable to actually influence the 
overall number of employee transfers through codetermination or collective agreement, 
but does aim to influence the conditions of transfer.  Consistent with their 
co-management role, works councils have paid particular attention to not just the 
quantity, but also the quality of jobs.  Works councils play a key role in upholding strong 
occupational labour markets in Germany by monitoring the deployment  and use of 
individual qualifications.  Given this occupation-centred tradition, works councils have 
not favoured collective transfers between group companies, as the presumption here is 
that such a move undermines the occupational integrity of individual e mployees.  
Moreover, individual labour rights in Germany more or less prohibit forced transfers to 
other companies—particularly the civil servants, who must choose to voluntarily go on 
leave from their civil servant status (Darbishire 1997).  Thus, movement is on an 
individual basis wherein the PMS plays a role as a clearing-house in the group-internal 
labour market.  This strategy coincided with the interests of subsidiary management, 
who favoured autonomy in hiring from the external labour market rather t han being 
forced to find work for redundant T-Com employees and particularly civil servants.  The 
strongest movements were thus from T-Com to T-Systems.  Here employees share the 
same occupational qualifications, the main difference being different target customers.  
Also many T -Com telephone operators were moved to call centres at T -Mobile and 
T-Online.     24
 
The latest wave of employment adjustment is conceived as a group-wide process 
involving 55,000 employees worldwide by 2005.  Here about 30,000 employees are from 
the parent company, plus around 3,000 from T-Systems, 1,000 from T-Mobile and around 
12,000 foreign employees.  The decision over reductions was taken unilaterally by 
management, but implemented in consultation with labour.  The adjustment process has 
strict parameters—none of the civil servants can be dismissed under German law and 
other DT AG employees enjoy protection from redundancies through the year 2004.  The 
announcement genuinely shocked both unions and works councils, leading to 
widespread demonstrations by employees.  However, if the target is not met, DT 
threatened not to renew the job protection agreement in 2004 and would resort for the 
first time to involuntary dismissals.  Hence, the union felt little alternative but to 
co-operate i n the employment adjustment process—although many remain sceptical 
whether they will succeed.   
 
To cope with these restrictions, the Personnel Services Agency (PSA) was 
established by collective agreement with Verdi.  The PSA plays an intermediate role as a 
temporary step to qualify workers from the parent company with further training, as 
well as place them with temporary or permanent jobs at other firms or public agencies 
(in the case of civil servants).  People are selected for the PSA by a clearing procedure 
involving defined individual characteristics, as well as the reorganisation of work 
processes.  The novel feature of the PSA is the increased emphasis on external 
employment adjustment.  
 
  Meanwhile, these recent measures renewed debate about the boundary of 
employment security within the group.  Unlike the parent, employees at the three other 
divisions have not enjoyed guaranteed job security. Now for the first time, market 
growth is slowing and exposing some over-capacity. 10  These subsidiaries will thus resort 
to more traditional measures of “benevolent” employment reduction through natural 
fluctuation, part-time work, early retirement, etc.  However, subsidiaries fear that given 
the protections of parent company employees and civil servants, subsidiary employees 
may be even more at risk. Hence, negotiations renewed about establishing job protection 
agreements at various group companies at the time of writing. 
 
                                                 
10 For example, during the rapid growth of mobile telephones, call centres were highly 
staffed to assure a quick service level.  Now market saturation has reduced demand.   25
3. NTT 
 
This section begins by describing the transformation in NTT’s corporate form, 
giving particular attention to the period between privatisation in 1985 and the adoption 
of the holding company structure in 1999.  The development of the enterprise union at 
NTT – Zendentsu, changing its name to NWJ in 1998 – is then discussed, before we turn 
to  a discussion of  the nature of interaction between corporate strategy and union 
strategy.  The analysis focuses  on bargaining and consultation that took place over a 
major corporate restructuring plan introduced in mid-2002. 
 
Both NTT management and the union were fiercely opposed to breaking up the 
corporation.  But over time, NTT management began to acquiesce to regulatory 
pressures for hiving off divisions as the corporation’s business diversified.  The union 
has entertained the security of employment for its members as a top priority objective.  
Because of this, the union remained unified as NTT Corporation disintegrated 
horizontally.  One key union strategy to extend its boundary to the NTT Group as a 
whole was to negotiate the extension of the central collective agreement not only to 
existing members but also to new recruits at hive-off companies.  Ultimately, labour 
strategy, rather than corporate strategy, was binding in maintaining a homogeneous set 
of human resource practices for the whole NTT Group.  Nevertheless, the union has 
begun to allow for slow  managed decentralisation in bargaining and consultation, 
leading to the prospect of greater diversity in HR practices in the future. 
 
 
Transformation in Corporate Form: From Public to Private, from Unitary to a Holding 
Company Structure 
 
From 1946, telecommunications was under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of 
Communications that also had authority over the postal service. The origin of NTT 
Corporation today can be traced back to 1949 when the Ministry of Communications was 
split into the Ministry of Posts and Ministry of Telecommunications.  In 1952, the 
Ministry of Telecommunications was turned into a public corporation, Nippon Telephone 
and Telegraph Public Corporation,11 modelled after Tennessee Valley Authority with 
                                                 
11 Employees of public corporations are governed by the Public Corporations Labour 
Law (koroho), and have a different status from national and local civil servants.  Here 
lies the difference with the Deutsche Telekom that employs civil servants.  Public   26
much backing from the New Dealers amongst the SCAP forces.  At the same time, the 
Ministry of Posts was renamed the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (MPT) to 
oversee the NTT Public Corporation.  From  the 1950s  into the 1980s, MPT’s top 
bureaucrats  always came from the postal side of the business, not experienced in 
telecom issues, whilst MPT’s telecommunications section was manned by officials on 
secondment from NTT.  In effect, NTT supervised itself (Anchordoguy 2001).  
 
  This set up of a powerful public corporation having an upper hand over the 
government ministry was disturbed in 1982, when the Nakasone Cabinet recommended 
the privatisation of publicly owned utilities as part of its administrative reform (known 
as rincho).  The Ministry of Post and Telecommunications grabbed this opportunity to 
recommend the break-up of NTT Public Corporation, American-style. On  the  whole, 
neither NTT nor its union, Zendentsu, was against privatisation per se.  But both were 
united in its opposition to the idea of a break-up.  Mr Shinto, the powerful head of the 
NTT Public Corporation at the time, was able to quell internal opposition to 
privatisation led by the deputy head, Mr Kitahara.   Mr Yamagishi, the Zendentsu union 
leader at the time, had the political clout to negotiate directly with Mr Kanemaru of the 
Liberal Democratic Party to push for privatisation without divestiture.  This episode 
makes clear that in this regulated industry, politics is at least as important as corporate 
strategy in understanding the emergence of a particular corporate structure. 
 
  In 1985, Japan became the second country after the United States to  end the 
monopoly status of the telephone company.  NTT Corporation managed to prevent a 
break-up by emphasising the importance of a nationally unified telephone network to 
deliver a universal service, and of preserving NTT’s R&D capability for international 
competitiveness.  Nevertheless, the government  treated the 1985  privatisation and 
liberalisation (enabling the entry of new common carriers) as unfinished business.  For 
the government, the break-up of NTT was considered an essential piece in completing 
the  task of enforcing open and fair competition in the telecoms market.  Thus, the 
Ministry of Post and Telecommunication (and the Liberal Democrats) deliberated at 
their respective committees, on how to reform NTT further – always centred around the 
emotive issue of the break up of the company -- in 1990, 1995 and 1996. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
corporation employees in Japan have the right to organize and collectively bargain, but 
do not have the right to strike.  The same law prohibits union shop agreements at public 
corporations.   27
  NTT Public Corporation had essentially a functional organisation at the head 
office with a large network of regional telephone exchanges and sales offices.  After 
privatisation, but gradually before  privatisation also, NTT began to adopt a 
multidivisional structure as it diversified into areas other than the building and 
servicing of fixed-line telephones. In part to pre-empt the divestiture pressures, NTT 
Corporation decided to hive off the following internal divisions (see Figure 3): 
(a)  NTT Data, created in 1988 by hiving off the Data Communications Bureau 
(established in 1967); 
(b)  NTT DoCoMo, created in 1992 by hiving off the Mobile Division; 
(c)  NTT Facilities, established also in 1992 by hiving off the Architectural Division; and 
(d)  NTT Comware, created in 1997 by hiving off the Communications Software Division 
(established in 1991). 
At NTT Data and NTT DoCoMo, employees in the internal division were transferred 
permanently (tenseki) to the newly created companies at the time of the hive-off.  This 
clear separation was considered necessary to meet the regulatory requirement of fair 
competition, as the two companies’ client base was in the open market.  By contrast, 
employees at NTT Facilities and NTT Comware remained on  temporary  transfer 
(shukko) from NTT Corporation until April 2002, as both are largely dependent on NTT’ 
fixed line business.12 
 
By 1996, Prime Minister Hashimoto returned from the G8 summit in Lyon, 
determined to force a settlement in the decade-long warfare between NTT and MPT.  
There was a feeling that this warfare had left Japan behind in the increasingly 
globalizing market,  symbolised by the merger between British Telecom and MCI 
International, US’s Number 2 long distance carrier. Thus, Hashimoto put the 
internationalisation of NTT operations high on the agenda.  In response, the MPT 
proposed the break-up of the NTT Corporation into two regional companies and one 
company for long-distance and international operations.  What made the MPT proposal 
palatable to the NTT management (and the union) w as the additional elements: to 
create a pure holding company, not yet legalised at the time of this proposal (not until 
1997), so as to make the  ‘break up’ not really a  ‘break-up’, and to  allow corporate 
                                                 
12 At NTT, there are three distinct modes of transferring workers between group 
companies.  Shukko refers to temporary transfers, whilst tenseki refers to permanent 
transfers.  There are two types of shukko, one with a fixed term and another that is 
indefinite.  The latter differs from tenseki to the extent that the ‘domicile’, as it were, 
remains with the sending company in the former but moves to the receiving company in 
the latter.   28
taxation on consolidated accounts (which was not the norm in Japan until 2002). The 
MPT  officials worked o n the Liberal Democratic Party Committee on 
Telecommunication Issues to include these two enticing elements in the policy package 
(Sakuma 1995 p.17). 
 
Thus, in July 1999, NTT became the second company after Daiei (the 
department store) to adopt the holding company structure, overseeing not only the three 
newly created companies (NTT East, NTT West and NTT Communications), but also the 
four companies that were hived off earlier.  The slim and agile holding company, 
employing only 300 staff in key functions s uch as corporate planning, finance, and 
personnel, also suited those who wanted to ride the wave of corporate governance reform, 
in this case, transforming a company run by Tokyo university graduates with a public 
servant mindset into a private sector company that took shareholders and stock market 
discipline seriously.  Nevertheless, it is important to remember that the holding 
company is relatively weak due to its origin as a face-saving political compromise 
between those who wanted to retain NTT as a single company and those in favour of a 
break-up.  One manifestation of such weakness is the complaints by various operating 
companies that the holding company has not exercised clear leadership in adjudicating 
over  head-to-head competition and  cannibalisation  of  business domains among NTT 
group companies.  This problem is likely to grow as every group company looks to 
business expansion away from fixed line telephones towards ISP and broadband. 
 
The largest shareholder of NTT is still the Japanese government, which owns 
46% of total shares.  The NTT Group consists of 8 core companies including the holding 
company, although if every single subsidiary and affiliates are counted, there are 438 as 
of mid-2002.  These group companies are classified into one of four types: Type 1 
(regulation companies), namely NTT East and NTT West; Type 2 (competition 
companies), namely NTT Communications, NTT Data, and NTT DoCoMo; Type 3 
(companies that provide managerial resources to Type 1 and Type 2 companies), namely 
NTT Facilities, NTT Comware, and outsourcing companies created in May 2002; and 
Type 4 (companies in new business), such as NTT-Broadband and NTT Electronics.  Of 
the eight core companies, all excepting two are fully owned subsidiaries of the  NTT 
holding company (NTT HC).  The exceptions are NTT Data, which had an IPO in 1995, 
with 54% shareholding by the NTT HC, and NTT DoCoMo, which had an IPO in 1998, 
with 64% shareholding by NTT HC.   
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The links between the holding company board and the board of directors at the 
operating companies are weak. Typically, one non-director manager from the holding 
company sits on the board of the operating company. There is a Group Management 
Council of the eight core companies at various levels, from company presidents down to 
functional heads including personnel managers.  The eight company presidents get 
together every quarter to inform each other of their respective business plans.  The eight 
personnel managers gather to share information and co-ordinate their bargaining 
stance especially during the Shunto negotiation rounds. 
 
At least three key factors underlie the cohesion of the eight companies, despite 
a weak holding company.  First, each company was created as a hive-off of an internal 
division of significant size at NTT Corporation.  For example, NTT Data, the first 
hive-off, involved taking on 6500 workers already employed in the NTT Data 
Communications division.  At NTT Facilities, hived off in 1992, 80% of the 6000+ 
employees were still on temporary transfer (shukko) ten years later, in April 2002 when 
all Facilities employees were put on permanent transfer (tenseki).  This hive-off process, 
in the context of the lifetime employment norm, has reinforced the need to implement a 
human resource management system at the hive-off that is identical to the originating 
parent company.  Moreover, the majority of employees in the separate companies retain 
fresh memory of having worked as part of the same company, enhancing the social 
identity of the NTT Group. (An exception to this is NTT DoCoMo, where rapid expansion 
led to half of its 11,000 employees being less than 30 year old, with experience of working 
only for DoCoMo.)   
 
Second, cohesion of the NTT Group is likely to remain as long as intra-Group 
trading patterns are dominant.  Around 80-90% of the business at NTT Facilities and 
NTT Comware are for the NTT Group.  Moreover, NTT Data, NTT DoCoMo, and NTT 
Communications, despite their dispersed client base, rely on NTT Group companies as 
suppliers of services.   
 
Third, the NTT Group remains cohesive in so far as the core eight companies 
put together are treated as the  organisational boundary of the union.  In order to 
understand this boundary choice, we will now turn to the strategy and structure of 
Zendentsu and its successor, NWJ. 
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Union Strategy and Structure 
  All NTT Workers Union of Japan (NWJ) is the largest enterprise union in 
Japan today, with a membership of 185,000.   It can be traced back to 1950, when 
Zendentsu (Japanese Telecommunication Workers Union) was founded initially with 
about 43,000 members and a unionisation rate of 34%. Subsequently, despite an open 
shop agreement – the legacy of the legally prescribed practice for public corporations – 
Zendentsu and now NWJ have boasted a union density of over 99%.13   
 
  Over time, Zendentsu has developed two faces of unionism that underlie its 
strategy (JIL 1996).  First, Zendentsu, as compared to private sector unions, had strong 
local units that exercised job control, in the face of technological change, particularly 
involving the shift from manual to automated telephone exchanges. Local job control 
was for the sake of employment security.  But as the abolition and mergers of telephone 
exchanges led to negotiated movements of employees between geographical areas, 
employment security had to be defended not locally but in a nation-wide internal labour 
market.  This gave Zendentsu an opportunity, in the 1960s, gradually to centralise the 
collective agreement for the whole NTT Public Corporation, harmonising differences in 
working conditions and personnel systems between regions. Zendentsu also negotiated a 
prior consultation system, in which management was required to consult the union over 
business plans and new technologies that affected employment at an early stage.  
Although i t stops short of being a co-determination system as in Germany, this prior 
consultation system gives much greater power to the union than is typical in private 
industry in Japan. 
 
Second, from the mid-1970s, Zendentsu developed a strategy for participation, 
not only in management, but also in government policy-making.  Policy participation 
was quite common amongst industry federations of private sector unions such as in steel 
and automobiles at the time, as the post-1973 inflation led them to realise the 
vulnerability of bargaining only over nominal wages. What is peculiar for Zendentsu 
was that it was an enterprise union for a regulated public monopoly, and therefore had 
the same industry-wide organisational boundary as an industry federation.  Policy 
participation led Zendentsu to accumulate experience in mobilising political resources, 
not just to support  Socialist and  Social  Democratic opposition parties, but also to 
influence policy debate in government and Liberal Democratic party committees.  Later, 
                                                 
13 Less than one percent of NTT Group workers are organised by minority unions, such 
as the Communist Party controlled Tsushin Roso and Dentsu Roso.   31
this neo-corporatist face paid off in giving Zendentsu power to influence NTT’s corporate 
structure in a direct manner.  As mentioned earlier, the 1985 privatisation without a 
break-up was largely due to Zendentsu working on NTT management, the Liberal 
Democratic Party, and the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications.   
 
  When NTT Corporation started hiving off divisions after privatisation, 
Zendentsu had a clear strategy to retain the living standards of existing members when 
they moved to the newly created companies.  This translated into the establishment of a 
norm, that whenever an internal division was hived off, it remained covered by the 
existing collective agreement.  Starting with NTT Data in 1988, and even in the case of 
NTT DoCoMo in 1992, neither management nor labour appeared to have questioned this 
norm; why change the working conditions of existing employees in an existing workplace 
when the only thing that has changed is the corporate form?  By default, there was no 
notion of a transition agreement as at Deutsche Telekom, nor a distinction made 
between pre-existing employees and newly hired employees.  The practice of extending 
an existing central collective agreement to group companies meant applying the 
agreements to all regular employees including new recruits.  It also led Zendentsu to 
become, in effect, a union covering the whole NTT Group rather than individual 
operating companies. 
 
  More recently, in anticipation of the adoption of the holding company structure, 
Zendentsu restructured its own organisation in December 1998, from being a regionally 
based structure to a company-based structure.  In particular, each of the eight core 
group companies was organised as a union branch.  The union took this opportunity to 
rename itself All NTT Workers Union of Japan, or NWJ.  Whilst the internal structure 
was reformed, the organisational boundary of the union was not changed.  Thus, as 
management formed a corporate group,  the union remained a single unified union, 
rejecting an alternative structure that was debated at the time, namely the federation of 
enterprise unions at the operating companies.  
 
  A consequence of this union decision is that the union is more centralised than 
corporate management.  This asymmetry brings about what appears to be much 
duplication of efforts on both sides in bargaining and consultation. In collective 
bargaining, NWJ HQ retained the right to negotiate all terms, including both 
substantive and procedural issues, with each of the eight key group companies, with a 
view to a rriving at an identical agreement for all.  This meant that the union HQ   32
officials sat with each company management to bargain,  to the exclusion of union 
representatives at the company-level branch.   
 
From spring 2001, however, collective bargaining has b een  decentralised, 
giving the company-level union branch the right to bargain over all issues except basic 
work conditions (especially the wage levels, although there is considerable 
disagreements among union branches as to what else constitutes the basic conditions).  
This means that in effect, each company management has two bargaining levels, one 
with the union HQ and the other with the company-level union branch.  For shorthand, 
these two may be called ‘central’ bargaining and ‘company-level’ bargaining, but ‘central’ 
implies the involvement of the union HQ, but not a group-wide NTT management 
representation (see Figure 5 for a schematic representation of this structure).   
 
A similar two-level system exists for labour-management consultation.  For 
example,  NTT  DoCoMo management consults with the union HQ over DoCoMo’s 
business plan in the context of a corporate group-wide vision.  In separate meetings, the 
same DoCoMo management team discusses DoCoMo-specific issues in greater detail 
with the DoCoMo union branch.  Interestingly, the holding company management has 
precisely the same two-level consultation system, without the power to take up issues 
for the NTT Group as a whole.  Thus, the union, by virtue of retaining a partially 
centralised system of bargaining and consultation, is acting like a holding company, in 
some sense more able to act on the basis of group-wide information than the holding 
company itself. The weak nature of the holding company is therefore reflected, not just 
in the vertical articulation of managerial decision making, but also in the system of 
employee representation and consultation. 
 
To summarise on the employee representation system at NTT Group, three 
phases can be identified in the managed decentralisation of the system.  First, at the 
time of privatisation in 1985, a single corporate entity, NTT Corporation, bargained and 
consulted with a single labour entity, Zendentsu.  Second, from 1988 (with the first 
hive-off) until 2001, collective bargaining was centralised (i.e. the union HQ negotiated a 
single identical outcome with each of the group companies), whilst consultation took 
place at central and company levels.  Third, from 2001, bargaining is partially 
decentralised, as company-level union branches were given the right to negotiate over 
all terms other than those concerning basic work conditions. 
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Corporate Restructuring Negotiations in 2001/2 
  The 2002 restructuring of NTT Group provides a good occasion to understand 
how corporate strategy and union strategy interacted in redrawing the organisational 
boundaries.  The restructuring involved not only changes in corporate structures  – a 
subject for labour-management consultation  – but also changes in basic working 
conditions (involving pay) that were subjected to central collective bargaining.  In effect, 
the whole bargaining and consultation exercise involved concertation at the NTT Group 
level, from the spring of 2001 until December 2001.  Proper procedures were followed in 
both channels of bargaining and consultation.  But t he unusually harsh mood that 
prevailed is testimony to a fundamental disagreement between management and labour.   
Management proposed the narrowing of the corporate boundaries, externalising a 
significant proportion of the existing organisation in the form of outsourcing companies. 
The union bargained for, and failed to attain, what had been the norm thus far, namely 
the maintenance of living standards for existing union members when corporate forms 
change.  
 
The negotiated outcome involved a plan to reduce costs by 110 billion yen (of 
which 35 billion was to come from labour cost reduction) at NTT East and 155 billion yen 
(of which 65 billion due to labour cost reduction) at NTT West during the 2002/3 fiscal 
year.  There were four instruments to reduce labour costs.  First, various benefit systems 
(including retirement pension) were reviewed and some allowances (e.g. for cold climate) 
abolished with a view to introducing more performance-related elements.  Second, 
16,400 (6400 from East, 10,000 from West) were to be made to take early retirement, in 
addition to 9400 who had already retired by December 2001.  Third, it was agreed that a 
total of 6500 would be transferred from East and West to other group companies.  Fourth, 
and this absorbed the greatest part of hard bargaining between management and the 
union, around 100 outsourcing companies were established by NTT East and West, and 
nearly 60,000 employees were transferred to these companies in May 2002.  Employees 
aged 50 or over were asked to take early retirement, then be re-employed by the new 
companies at a wage up to 30% lower than in their previous jobs.  The union started by 
negotiating for no pay cut, but ended up agreeing to the 15-30% wage reduction, with 
some lump-sum payment at the point of transfer to ease the pain of adjustment.  
 
These 60,000 or so employees are doing the same job (in sales, maintenance, 
etc.) as before, with the same work colleagues in the same workplace, but one day the   34
company name changes and the pay check declines by up to 30%.  This is the cost of 
treating employment security as the top priority under all circumstances, as both 
management and labour shun the use of compulsory redundancy.  Thus, the norm of 
income maintenance has been broken, but this is so as to defend the norm of ‘lifetime 
employment’.  Employees at  the outsourcing companies retain union membership.  So 
the outsourcing companies remain within the bounds of NWJ.  But agreeing to wage 
reductions is the beginning of a thin wedge, providing a major challenge to cope with 
diverse workers within the same union.   
 
 
4. Comparisons of DT and NTT 
 
  This section directly compares the two telecommunications companies with a 
view to drawing out similarities and differences in the way corporate strategy  and 
structure interacted with  labour strategy  and structure.    Comparisons are made in 
terms of two outcomes, namely the degree of homogeneity in human resource practices 
within the corporate group, and the mechanisms chosen for making employment 
adjustment (for a summary, see Figure 8). 
 
(a) Corporate Strategies and Structures Compared 
In the last decade and a half, both DT and NTT engaged in a similar strategy of 
growth, diversifying from being primarily a fixed line telephone carrier with a U-Form 
structure, to a telecoms group engaged in data communications, mobile telephones, and 
internet service provision.  Thus, by 2002, DT had a multi-divisional structure, whilst 
NTT adopted a holding company structure.  The two companies were remarkably 
similar in the coverage of business, with the fixed line telephone business accounting for 
47% of total group sales at DT Group and 48% of NTT Group sales turnover (see Figure 
6).  T-Com at DT corresponds to NTT East, NTT West and NTT Communications put 
together.  Moreover, of the other half of sales turnover, mobile telephone service takes up 
a significant chunk, with T -Mobile accounting for 34% of total group sales and NTT 
DoCoMo accounting for 41% of total group sales.  
 
Despite these similarities in the nature of business, the way in which the two 
companies diversified is different.  In particular, DT adopted a policy to create new 
business with externally provided resources, whilst NTT adopted a policy of organic 
growth, hiving off existing divisions into independent companies.  At NTT Group,   35
DoCoMo is exceptional in achieving rapid growth, resulting in about half of the 11,000 
employees having been recruited by DoCoMo, with no work experience at N TT 
Corporation.  At the other group companies, the divisions were of significant size at the 
time of their hive-off, and did not grow much, so that new recruits remain a small 
minority in each company’s workforce.  By contrast, DT Group contains significant 
chunks of employees who had never worked for DT AG.  T-Online was a newly created 
business when it was founded in 1995.  T-Mobile, like DoCoMo, was created out of hiving 
off an internal division with 3200 employees, but has now grown into over 9000 
employees.  At T-Systems, employees at the operations that used to be part of DT AG are 
now outnumbered by at least a factor of 2:1 by the acquisition of Debis Systemhaus from 
DaimlerChrysler in 2000.  
 
The timing of the development of the corporate group is similar at DT and NTT, 
with new company formation concentrated in the 1990s.  But due to the late timing of 
privatisation at DT in 1995, group formation at DT preceded privatisation, but it 
happened clearly after privatisation in the case of NTT. 
 
A  contrast can  also  be seen in the vertical articulation of  the  management 
structure within the two corporate groups. At DT, central management has maintained 
greater strategic control over the group as a whole.  Despite the initial autonomy of 
subsidiaries during their creation, boundary disputes and post-merger integration of 
group business lines have prompted greater intervention from the central management. 
Subsidiary group management has been increasingly integrated within the group-wide 
management board, and extensive co-ordination exists across firms at lower levels of 
management, as discussed with regard to personnel departments.  Meanwhile, the NTT 
holding company has a somewhat weaker role in NTT group strategy.  Integration of the 
formal managerial hierarchy is considerably looser, and group-wide co-ordination is less 
formalised.  This has led, for example, to intra-group competition in new areas of 
business such as Internet service provision within the NTT Group, in contrast to a more 
unified strategy at DT Group.   
 
(b) Labour Strategies and Structures Compared 
Next, labour strategies with respect to the structures of union organisation and 
employee representation were quite different at DT and NTT.  In particular, the union at 
NTT retains a more centralised structure than the more decentralised collective 
bargaining and looser hierarchy of works councils within DT. At NTT, the NWJ union   36
decided to remain all encompassing in its horizontal boundary whilst maintaining a 
strong degree of vertical articulation by retaining the right to collectively bargain at the 
centre for all employees of the NTT Group.  There is a sense in which NWJ as the 
enterprise union has to reflect the corporate structure to an extent.  Thus, as a series of 
corporate hive-offs created a group of several distinct companies, the union could have 
adopted a mirror structure, in the form of a federation of enterprise unions.  But NWJ 
has thus far resisted this move, cautious in effecting a slow process of decentralisation in 
bargaining and consultation.   
 
By contrast, Verdi did not retain centralised collective bargaining when DT AG 
created new companies in systems, mobile and on-line businesses.  This appears to be 
due to a combination of factors, including (i) the union officials’ preoccupation with union 
mergers within Verdi, leaving less time to ‘strategize’ about organising the DT Group; 
(ii) jurisdictional dispute between Verdi and IG Metall in organising the IT sector; and 
(iii) the union’s feeling that a blind extension of the agreement at DT AG with some 
outdated/undesirable terms was not beneficial to employees at the new companies.  
Works councils were also created at new establishments and new companies, as legally 
prescribed, in the early 1990s.  But it was not until 1995 that a KBR was created at the 
group level.  Even today, the centre of gravity in the hierarchy of works councils remains 
at the corporate level, and is only slowly shifting upwards, towards the DT Group-wide 
level, as both management and labour recognise the need to develop a group-wide 
human resource system.  But unlike at NTT, centralised co-ordination must cope with 
considerable de facto diversity of employment conditions within the group. 
 
(c ) Degree of Diversity in Human Resource Practices 
As a result of both (a) and (b), there is greater variability in human resource 
practices within the DT Group than within the NTT Group.  Within the DT Group, each 
of the four divisions is subjected to a different arrangement (see Table 1).  T-Online has 
no agreement; T-Systems have multiple agreements, most notably the agreement with 
Verdi at those parts that used to be part of DT AG, and the agreement with IG Metall at 
Debis.  T -Mobile has an agreement since 1996, whilst a new NBBS agreement was 
signed at DT AG.  All major agreements now contain an element of performance related 
pay, but each is different on the proportion of monthly salary that is subjected to 
performance evaluation.  By contrast, the NTT Group is remarkable in having a single 
human resource system for the whole group.  The central collective agreement spells out 
all substantive terms and conditions of employment.  The same performance related pay   37
system was centrally negotiated and introduced to all group companies at the same time, 
in 2001.  The Shunto spring offensive settlements are highly co-ordinated, with the pay 
increases being identical for the eight group companies (see Table 2).  A concession is 
made in varying the bonus settlements so as to reflect company-level performance, 
better at faster growing DoCoMo and Data than in other parts of the Group.  
 
This means that although bonus levels vary slightly, a systems engineer of the 
same qualification and experience is on exactly the same wage package regardless of 
whether one works at the fast-growing NTT DoCoMo or at the loss-making NTT West.  
By contrast, a systems engineer would be paid differently within the DT Group, 
depending on whether one is at T-Systems or at T-Mobile.  This situation deviates from 
the larger national institutional patterns—where Japan follows the logic of an internal 
labour market and Germany utilises largely occupational labour markets with equal pay 
for equal work for a specific occupation.  
 
However, we would like to stress that these outcomes remain a moving target.  
It is possible that the reassertion of industrial unionism within the relatively new 
diversified telecoms sector may lead to industry-wide harmonisation of HR systems (if 
not  standardisation of pay levels) in Germany.  Also, it is possible that in Japan, 
pressures for diversity in HR systems within the NTT  Group will grow stronger, 
resulting in further  – slow and managed  – decentralisation of bargaining.  The 
trajectories are different, but DT and NTT may end up with a similar degree of diversity 
in employment  provisions within  a loosely co-ordinated and negotiated  group-wide 
system. 
 
(d) Internal and external employment adjustment instruments compared 
  Lastly, employment adjustment has been more internal at NTT Group than at 
DT Group.  Both Groups have managed to more than halve their workforce since 
privatisation, although NTT had a head start by a decade, since 1985 as compared to 
1995 for DT (see Figure 7).  The reduction in total employment to 178,000 at DT Group 
and 143,000 at NTT Group by spring 2002 has been achieved by exits outnumbering 
recruits by a factor of 2:1 or 3:1 at various times.  Apart from normal retirement, early 
retirement packages were used actively in waves at both DT and NTT.   
 
The similarity in the instruments of employment adjustment lies in the utmost 
effort made to avoid outright compulsory redundancies, although this is a matter of an   38
explicit job protection agreement at DT, whilst NTT is governed by a less formal lifetime 
employment norm (though enforceable in courts by case law). In effect, at DT, it is 
possible for a worker to refuse to be reassigned, in which case one falls outside the job 
protection agreement and can be made redundant.  Moreover, the 
disability-in-occupation certification enables employees to quit and obtain benefits from 
the state insurance fund.  Thus, the presence of the welfare state, although eroding at 
the margin, has enabled DT to share the burden of shedding excess labour with the state.  
By contrast, the absence of such a welfare state, as well as the centralised employee 
representation system in NTT, led to greater internalisation of employment adjustment 
within the NTT Group. 
 
Now that the possibility of further early retirement is exhausted, recent 
measures reveal more divergent practices.  At DT, December 2002 saw the creation of 
PSA (Personnel Services Agency), an internal agency charged with the task of finding 
jobs, both internal to the DT Group and externally in the open labour market, for 55,000 
excess workers by 2005.  At NTT, the creation of 100 outsourcing companies to reassign 
60,000 workers from NTT East and West in May 2002 is an adjustment of similar 
magnitude.  DT’s PSA contemplates employment adjustment external to the DT Group, 
whilst NTT’s outsourcing companies involve internal adjustments only.  This difference 
is in part due to the d ifferential expectations of workers in an occupational labour 
market – not easily fulfilled when most occupations exist only within the ex-monopoly 
DT Group, and those in an internal labour market (specific to a particular firm or 
corporate group).  However, it may also imply that employment security means different 
things at DT and NTT.  At least for the moment, DT workers assigned to PSA have full 
income security but dislocated from their normal jobs using their skills, whereas NTT 
workers at the outsourcing companies have employment security involving doing the 





  This paper applied an interactive strategy and structure framework to analyse 
the evolution of corporate structure and employee representation systems at Deutche 
Telekom and NTT. The framework enables the interpretation of the evolving enterprise 
boundaries for management and labour, without a simple reading of structural 
characteristics off the national institutional arrangements.     39
 
In the German system of industrial relations, industrial unions engage in 
industry-wide bargaining. Works councils at establishment and corporate levels are 
legally empowered to be consulted on, and co-decide, key parameters in working 
conditions that result from corporate decisions.  Particularly if the works councils are 
well controlled by the union, one would expect the maintenance of uniform work 
conditions for the whole industry as corporations restructure.  By contrast, in the 
Japanese system, enterprise unions engage in decentralised  – albeit co-ordinated  – 
bargaining.  The same unions engage in consultation at the enterprise level, but 
practices differ from company to company as the consultation system is not legally 
mandated.  Given this system of employee representation, one would expect a quicker 
introduction of variations in human resource practices with local company-level 
arrangements.  
 
Despite these broad expectations, what we find is that DT Group has more 
heterogeneous human resource systems despite the presence of industrial unions, than 
at NTT Group with its enterprise union.  This result is therefore surprising at first 
glance, but ceases to be so once the  essence of the analytical framework developed in 
this paper is understood.  
 
It was shown empirically that NTT’s corporate strategy is based more on hiving 
off existing internal divisions than DT’s strategy that involved employing new resources 
through new hires and M&A. It was also shown that the system of employee 
representation remained more centralised at NTT than at DT. NWJ was in full control of 
extending the existing collective agreement to hived-off companies, whilst neither Verdi 
nor the newly created works councils at the DT Group insisted on maintaining the DT 
AG agreement for new companies. 
 
What this episode shows, in relation to the analytical framework, is two-fold.  
First, labour strategy cannot be simply read off the existing union structure.  It is not 
the case that a single strategy of industry-wide bargaining emerges from an industry 
union structure.  There is a choice element in labour strategy, particularly when the 
emergence of new contiguous industries challenges the existing understanding of the 
boundary of an industry. Or, given an enterprise union structure, labour has a strategic 
choice in deciding whether or not to extend its boundary beyond the existing company.  
The exact strategy chosen depends, in part, on the existing union structures, but also on   40
resources, including political ones, that the union can command at the time.  In this 
sense, labour strategy can have a significant direct impact on corporate structure as well 
as industry structure.  Second, as a result, corporate boundaries, far from being 
determined primarily by corporate strategy, are often contested.    41
References 
 
Anchordoguy, Marie (2001) ‘Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Company (NTT) and the 
Building of a Telecommunications Industry in Japan’,  Business History Review Autumn, 
pp.507-541. 
 
Chandler, Alfred D. (1962) Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the 
Industrial Enterprise Cambridge MA: MIT Press. 
 
Chandler, Alfred D. (1992) ‘What is a firm? A historical perspective’ European Economic 
Review Vol.36, pp.483-994. 
 
Clegg, H. A. (1976) Trade Unionism under Collective Bargaining Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Commons, John R. (1909) ‘American Shoemakers, 1648-1895: A Sketch of Industrial 
Evolution’ Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol.24, pp.39-84. 
 
Darbishire, Owen (1997) ‘Germany’ in Kartz et al pp.189-227. 
 
Dore, Ronald (1996) ‘Unions between Class and Enterprise’ Industrielle Beziehungen 3 
Jg., Heft 2, pp.154-72. 
 
Hall, Peter and Soskice, David (eds.) (2001) Varieties of Capitalism New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Herrigel, Gary (1993) ‘Identity and Institutions: The Social Construction of Trade 
Unions in Nineteenth-Century Germany and the United States’  Studies in American 
Political Development Vol.7, pp.371-394. 
 
Jackson, Gregory (2003)  ‘Ambiguity, Creativity and Institutional Change:  The 
Contested Boundaries of Codetermination’ in Germany in Kathleen Thelen and 
Wolfgang Streeck (eds.)  Continuity and Discontinuity in Institutional Analysis 
forthcoming. 
 
Jackson, Gregory  (2003)  ‘Varieties of Capitalism: A Review’ MPIfG Discussion Paper, 
Max-Planck-Insitut fuer Gesellschaftsforschung, forthcoming.   42
 
Kalkowski, Peter, Matthias Helmer and Otfried Mickler (2001) Telekommunikation im 
Aufbruch. Wandel der Arbeitsstrukturen und Beschaeftigungsverhaeltnisse  
Duesseldorf: Hans Boeckler Stiftung. 
 
Kaufman, Bruce E. and Kleiner, Morris M. (eds.) (1993)  Employee Representation: 
Alternatives and Future Directions Madison: Industrial Relations Research Association. 
 
Kress, Carl. (1997) ‘The 1996 Telekommunikationsgesetz and the 1996 
Telecommunications Act: Towards More Competitive Markets in Telecommunications in 
Germany and the United States’  Federal Communications Law Journal Vol. 49, pp.551- 
 
JIL (1996)  Denki Tsushin Sangyo no Roshi Kankei: Rekishi to Genjo (Industrial 
Relations in the Telecommunications Industry: History and Current  State), Shiryo 
Series No.65, Tokyo: JIL. 
 
Katz, Harry (1993) ‘The decentralisation of collective bargaining: a literature review and 
comparative analysis’, Industrial and Labor Relations Review Vol.47 No.1, pp.3-22.  
 
Katz, Harry C. (ed.) (1997) Telecommunications: Restructuring Work and Employment 
Relations Worldwide Ithaca: ILR Press. 
 
Lamont, Michèle and Virág Molnár (2002)  ‘The Study of Boundaries in the Social 
Sciences’  Annual Review of Sociology  Vol. 28, pp.167-195. 
 
Nakamura, Keisuke and Hiraki, Shin’o (1997) ‘Japan’ Chapter 6 in Katz (ed.) 
Nelson, Richard R. (1991) ‘Why Do Firms Differ, and how Does It Matter?’  Strategic 
Management Journal Vol.12, pp.61-74. 
 
NTT Union (2002) NTT Roso Hossoku Iko no Undo o Furikaette (Looking back on the 
movement after the establishment of NTT Union) Tokyo: NTT Union. 
 
Rosenow, Joachim and Frieder Naschold (1994) Die Regulierung der Alternsgrenzen: 
Strategien von Unternehmen und Politik des Staates  Berlin. 
 
Sako, Mari (2003)  What is the Boundary of the Firm for Enterprise Unions?  Said   43
Business School mimeo. 
 
Sako, Mari  (2004, forthcoming) Shifting Boundaries of the Firm: Japanese Company – 
Japanese Labour, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Shimotani, M  (2000)  Mochikabu Gaisha Kaikin ( Re-legalizing Holding Companies) 
Tokyo: Iwanami shinsho. 
 
Sorge, Arndt (1991) Strategic Fit and the Societal Effect: Interpreting Cross-National 
Comparisons of Technology, Organization and Human Resources Organization Studies  
Vol. 12, Issue 2, pp.161-190. 
 
Streeck, Wolfgang (1993) Klasse, Beruf, Unternehmen, Distrikt: 
Organisationsgrundlagen industrieller Beziehungen im Europaeischen Binnenmarkt in 
Burkhart Struempel and Meinolf Dierkes (eds.) Innovation und Beharrung in der 
Arbeitspolitik Stuttgart: Schaeffer-Poeschel Verlag pp.39-68. 
 
Thelen, Kathleen and Ikuo Kume (2003)  ‘The Future of Nationally Embedded 
Capitalism: Industrial Relations in Germany and Japan’ in Kozo Yamamura and 
Wolfgang Streeck (eds.) The End of Diversity?  Prospects for German and Japanese 
Capitalism,  pp.183-211.  
 
Tilly, Charles (2003 forthcoming)  Social Boundary Mechanisms  Philosophy of the Social 
Sciences 
 
Ulman, Lloyd (1955) The Rise of the National Trade Union Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press. 
 
Undy, R., Ellis, V., McCarthy, W.E.J., & Halmos, A.M. (1981) Change in Trade Unions, 
Hutchinson. 
 
Undy, R., Fosh, P., Morris, H., Smith, P., and Martin, R. (eds.) (1996) Managing the 
Unions, Clarendon Press. 
 
Whittington, Richard (2001) What is Strategy – and Does it Matter? London: Thomson 
Learning Business Press.   44
 
Yoshihara, Yasunori (2000) ‘Kigyo no Gurupuka to Roshi Kankei: NTT Roso no Jirei wo 
Tsujita Kosatsu’ (Corporate Groupings and Labour-Management Relations: Thoughts 
based on the NTT Union Case)  Nihon Rodo Kenkyu Zasshi (JIL Journal) No. 484, 
November, pp.71-79. 
 
Zendentsu (1997) NTT Keiei Keitai Mondai to Zendentsu no Torikumi: Bunri Bunkatsu 
Hantai Undo Shoushi (The Problem of NTT’s Management Pattern and How Zendentsu 
Tackled it: A Short History of the Movement to Oppose Divestiture)   45
Appendix: List of Interviews Conducted 
 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with the following in Germany and Japan.  
Interview questions were sent prior to the meetings, in English for the German 





Deutsche Telekom AG Investor Relations, 10 December 2002 
DT AG HR Department, 11 December 2002 
Group meeting with personnel managers from T -Com, T -Systems, T -On-line, 11 
December 2002 
T-Mobile HQ, 17 December 2002 
 
Labour 
DT KBR, 10 December 2002 
T-Mobile GBR, 11 December 2002 
DT GBR, 11 December 2002 
Verdi, 14 January 2003 






NTT Holding Company, 24 July 2002 
NTT East, 24 January 2003 
NTT West, 27 January 2003 
NTT Communications, 23 January 2003 
NTT Data, 24 January 2003 
NTT DoCoMo, 23 January 2003 
NTT Facilities, 24 January 2003 
NTT Comware, 22 January 2003 
 
Labour   46
NTT Union HQ, 24 July 2002 
NTT Union HQ, 14 January 2003 
NTT West Union Branch, 3 June 2003 
NTT Comware Union Branch, 4 June 2003 
NTT East Union Branch, 4 June 2003 
NTT Communications Union Branch, 4 June 2003 
NTT Data Union Branch, 5 June 2003 
NTT Holding Company Union Branch, 5 June 2003 
NTT Facilities Union Branch, 6 June 2003 
NTT DoCoMo Union Branch, 6 June 2003  47























































N.B. Not all the possible influences are shown by the arrows.  48
 
 







Founded in 1995 
(122,887 employees in 2002) 
T-Systems International GmbH 
Founded 2000  
(4,226 employees in 2002) 
T-Mobile International AG 
Founded 1999 
(217 employees in 2002) 
 
T-Mobile Deutschland GmbH 
Founded in 1993 
(9,173 employees in 2002) 
T-Systems ITS 
Founded 2002 (Debis Systemhaus 1969)
(21,595 employees in 2002) 
T-Systems CME 
Founded 1992 
(6,789 employees in 2002) 
T-Systems Nova 
Founded in 1999 
(5,362 employees in 2002) 
T-Com (Internal Division) 
(110,575 employees in 2002) 
DeTe-Immobilien 
Founded 2002 
T-Online International AG 
Founded 1995 
(1,579 employees in 2002)   49
10
















1988: 6500 ; 2002: 7430
NTT Facilities (est.1992)
1992: 6700; 2002: 6180
NTT DoCoMo (est 1992)
1992: xx , 2002: 11,730
NTT Comware (est. 1997)
1997: 8250  2002: 8580
NTT Communications(est. 1999)
1999: 7440; 2002: 7440 
NTT East (est. 1999)
1999: 61740; 2002: 48,260
NTT West (est. 1999)
1999: 68270; 2002: 50450
NTT Holding Company(1999)






Figure 3: NTT Group  50
 
Figure 4 
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Employee Representation at NTT Group, 2003
(Company-based Branches)
NTT Holding Company NTT Holding Company
























NWJ National HQ NWJ National HQ














NTT Data NTT Data NTT 
Facilities
NTT 
Facilities Collective bargaining and 
consultation at company 
level
Collective bargaining and 
consultation
Labor-Management Council, National 
Bargaining Committee
Divisions, Subsidiaries, Sales 
Offices
Divisions, Subsidiaries, Sales 
Offices
NWJ Branch Offices NWJ Branch Offices



















吭䍯 吭卹獴敭 吭䵯扩汥 吭佮汩湥 佴桥牳
Both DT and NTT have 50% of sales in 






Employment declines after Privatization 
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Figure 8 
 
Corporate Strategy and Structure 
 
  Strategy  Structure 
Deutsche Telekom  Diversification 
Growth through external 
resources 
M-form 
Strong central management 
 
NTT  Diversification 
Growth through internal 
resources 
H-form 






Labour Strategy and Structure 
 
  Strategy  Structure 
Deutsche Telekom  Conflicted strategy of 





Weak central KBR, strong 
GBR 
 
NTT  Group-wide solidarity,  
job security via internal 
adjustment 
Enterprise Union 






GIVE RISE TO 
 
Diverse Employment Outcomes 
 
  HRM  Employment Adjustment 
 
Deutsche Telekom  Diverse  External 
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Table 1 Collective Agreements within the DT Group,  
Selected Characteristics 2002 
 
  Deutsche Telekom AG 
 
T-Mobile  T-Systems International** 
 
T-Online 
Collective Agreement  Yes, NBBS.  Yes.  Yes, but multiple 
agreements for different 
subsidiaries. 
No. 
Basic Pay  Fixed monthly salary.  Fixed monthly salary.  Yearly salary.  Stipulates 
minimum and m aximum 
salary.  Management 
discretion within corridor 
(ranging between 7.5% and 
60.5% depending on job 
category). 
 
Performance Related Pay  6-12% of monthly salary 
given 100% performance.  
Weighting 2/3 individual/ 
team performance, 1/3 
corporate performance. 
10% of monthly salary given 
100% performance.  
Weighting 2/3 individual/ 
team performance, 1/3 
corporate performance. 
 
Yes.     
Number of Wage Categories  10 categories, plus 6 
categories for sales-related 
jobs. 
8 categories.  10 categories.   
Working Time  38 hours    35 to 40 hours, depending 
upon age 
 
  Job Category T5 
 
28,068 to 33,792 Euro per 
year. 
  Job Category 5 
 
33,900 to 50,850 per year. 
 
**Major subsidiaries of TSI have separate collective agreements that may deviate substantially from these parameters. 
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Table 2: Shunto Spring Offensive Bargaining Settlements at NTT Group Companies 1998-2003 
坡来                                    
  1998      1999      2000        2001      2002        2003     
Company Name  Base up  %  Demand Base up %  Demand Base up  %  Demand Base up  %  Demand Base up  %  Demand Base up %  Demand 
NTT  2,306 0.66 8800                                             
Holding 
Company           921 0.26 3200 0 0 1% 0 0none  0 0none  0 0none 
East           921 0.26 3200 0 0 1% 0 0none  0 0none  0 0none 
West           921 0.26 3200 0 0 1% 0 0none  0 0none  0 0none 
Communications           921 0.26 3200 0 0 1% 0 0none  0 0none  0 0none 
Facilities  2306 0.66 8800 921 0.26 3200 0 0 1% 0 0none  0 0none  0 0none 
Comware  2306 0.66 8800 921 0.26 3200 0 0 1% 0 0none  0 0none  0 0none 
Data  2306 0.66 8800 921 0.26 3200 0 0% 1% PA Y500    none  PA Y500     none  0 0none 
DoCoMo  2306 0.66 8800 921 0.26 3200 0 0% 1% PA Y1000   none  PA Y300     none  0 0none 
                                     
䉯湵                                    
  1998      1999      2000        2001      2002        2003     
Company Name  Settled  plus  Demand Settled plus  Demand Settled  plus Demand Settled plus Demand Settled  plus Demand Settledplus  Demand 
NTT  5,48  0.42   5.48 0.42   5.1      4.8      4.4              
Holding 
Company           5.48 0.42   5.1      4.8      4.4      4.3   4.6
East           5.48 0.42   5.1      4.8      4.4      4.3   4.6
West           5.48 0.42   5.1      4.8      4.4      4.3   4.6
Communications           5.48 0.42   5.1      4.8      4.4      4.15     
Facilities  5.48 0.42   5.48 0.42   5.1      4.8      4.4      4.3   4.4+x
Comware  5.48 0.42   5.48 0.42   5.1      4.8      4.4      4.3     
Data  5.480.47+50K     5.480.47+60K     5.8250K     5.8925K     5.48166K     5.96     
DoCoMo  5.480.52+280K     5.480.57+220K     5.98218K     5.98233K     5.48386K     5.48     
 
 